Fireworks at the Santiago Bernabeu (Real Madrid Vrs Bayern Munich-UCL 2023/2024); An intense Tactical View Of Real Madrid’s ‘magic’ Win.

The Kings of the UCL, Real Madrid

Real Madrid’s Santiago Bernabeu was full of mixed emotions once again as Real Madrid came back from a 1-0 down to win the UCL game in the dying minutes. Joselu Mato stepped up to score two important goals to secure a late qualification for Real Madrid. His first goal came after an uncharacteristic fumble by Manuel Neuer, whose goalkeeping had done so much to thwart Madrid up to that point. The second, in the 91st minute, was awarded after deliberation from the VAR officials following a possible offside.

The starting line-up for both clubs were as follows:

Real Madrid;

13 Andriy Lunin, 23 Ferland Mendy, 6 Nacho Fernandez, 22 Antonio Rüdiger, 2 Dani Carvajal, 5 Jude Bellingham, 8 Toni Kroos, 18 Aurélien Tchouaméni, 15 Federico Valverde, 7 Vinícius Júnior, 11 Rodrygo Goes

Bayern Munich;

1 Manuel Neuer, 6 Joshua Kimmich, 4 Matthijs de Ligt,15 Eric Dier, 40 Noussair Mazraoui, 27 Konrad Laimer, 45 Aleksandar Pavlovic, 7 Serge Gnabry, 42 Jamal Musiala, 10 Leroy Sané, 9 Harry Kane

We take a look at the various tactics employed by both coaches. Ancelotti continues to show maturity and consistency in delivering results at the highest level of club football.

Breaking down the 4-4-2 blocks

As in the first leg, both teams utilised a 4-4-2 block when defending. With neither team consistently pressing high, they were both tasked with breaking down this block. Bayern’s 4-4-2 (below) had Jamal Musiala remaining high with Harry Kane in the first line, while both wingers worked back to track Madrid’s full-backs. When Davies came on for the injured Serge Gnabry after 27 minutes, Bayern’s left side was strengthened defensively, with Madrid searching for a way to attack the opposite wide area.

Against Bayern’s 4-4-2 block, Madrid were almost forming a 3-5-2 attacking shape (below), with Toni Kroos dropping out to the left, as he so often does. Both full-backs pushed on, with Jude Bellingham and Federico Valverde moving inside to support, ahead of what became a single pivot in Aurélien Tchouaméni. Vinicius acted as the central threat in the first half, with Rodrygo roaming and drifting into new areas, attacking both sides. Valverde and Dani Carvajal occasionally swapped roles, while Bellingham was influential in the left inside channel.

Out of possession, Madrid’s 4-4-2 block (below) operated similar to Bayern’s, leaving Rodrygo and Vinícius high as the first line. Bellingham and Valverde filled wide-midfield roles, tracking any full-back movements, rotations or forward runs – even if that meant working beyond their own full-back. As Madrid’s second line defended so narrow, it limited Bayern’s access into their number 10, Musiala, with Antonio Rüdiger ready to spring out of the back line when needed.

Leroy Sané and initially Gnabry – later Davies – held the width for Bayern, attempting to stretch Madrid’s back line across the pitch (below). Kane operated between the centre-backs, with Konrad Laimer, Aleksandar Pavlovic and Musiala often marked, especially as Rodrygo worked deeper. In their best moments of the first half, Joshua Kimmich’s inward movements from right-back helped Bayern progress, getting away from Bellingham to act as a second number 10. This was ideal when Musiala had taken his player across, opening access into the front line, but Bayern’s final ball was an issue in the first half.

Second-half adaptations

In the second half, Sané moved much narrower from the right, acting as a second 10 with Musiala (below). Kimmich then advanced and held the width more. Musiala’s dropping helped link the double pivot and back line into advanced teammates. Noussair Mazraoui rarely pushed forward from left-back, allowing Davies to stay 1v1 in bigger spaces against Carvajal. This paid off when Bayern took the lead through Davies’ superb, bending effort, after he had cut inside Carvajal. As with the first half, though, Bayern had promising moments, but lacked the final ball that was desperately needed to see off the Spanish champions.

Madrid also adapted in the second half, as Vinícius moved over to the left. Ancelotti’s game plan then became clear: work the ball to the left and allow Vinícius to drive, dribble and run at the Bayern back line. For a period he was unplayable, beating his opponents, working attempts and flipping the momentum in Madrid’s favour. He had the beating of Kimmich, but also exploited moments when the Germany international had advanced, putting him in 1v1s against De Ligt (below).

Madrid provided support around Vinícius, adding combinations to his final-third play. Although on occasion this helped him progress forward, the close connections did sometimes hinder his progress, attracting Bayern players who killed the spaces he needed to drive into (below). With no central-forward threat either, Bayern’s centre-backs could be very aggressive in their positioning and support around Kimmich. Sané’s recoveries back also provided support, alongside the closest of Bayern’s double pivot, with Madrid missing a central, focal point in attack.

Tuchel attempted to see the game out by converting to a back five, bringing on Kim Min-jae for Sané after 76 minutes. Davies or Mazraoui then dropped out to track the runs of Carvajal or Mendy. This allowed Kimmich and Kim to protect the inside channels against Vinícius and Brahim Díaz, who Ancelotti brought on for Rodrygo on 81 minutes. At the same time, Joselu replaced Valverde; his presence gave Madrid a focal point around Bayern’s centre-backs, despite their extra player in the back line (below).

Against Bayern’s 5-3-1-1 defensive block (above) another Madrid substitute, Luka Modric, conducted the play, working the ball into the front line with pace and purpose. In typical Madrid fashion, they then produced another stunning European comeback, thanks to Joselu’s poaching. Their opponents in the final, Borrusia Dortmund cannot say they have not been warned.